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INTRODUCTION
Equality of educational opportunity is an elusive goal. Advocates for
underprivileged students have pursued it relentlessly in the courts since the
landmark decision fifty years ago in Brown v. Board of Education.' Yet
children across the United States still attend schools that are both separate and
unequal. The United States contains approximately 15,000 school districts.
2
This fragmentation, along with the Supreme Court's decision in Milliken v.
Bradley3 to prohibit mandatory busing across district lines, allows patterns of
residential segregation to produce segregated schools. In 2000-01, seventy-two
percent of African-American and seventy-six percent of Latino students
attended predominantly minority schools.4 Thirty-seven percent of African-
American 5 and Latino6 students attended schools that were 90-100% minority.
One-sixth of African-American and one-ninth of Latino students attended
schools that were 99-100% minority.
7
Fragmentation of districts also produces fiscal inequities and inadequacies.
8
In 2000-01, Ascension Parish, Louisiana spent 41.6% more per pupil than
neighboring Livingston Parish,9 and New Hanover County, North Carolina
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spent 45.3% more per pupil than Onslow County.10 Beaufort County, South
Carolina spent $2112 more per pupil than neighboring Charleston, which
amounts to an extra $42,240 for each class of twenty students." Sarasota
County, Florida spent $46,980 more per class of twenty than nearby Polk
County.
12
The persistence of disparities among school districts has prompted litigants
to file school finance cases in forty-five states, with some states experiencing
multiple rounds of litigation.' 3 Despite a mixed record of success, the trend
shows no sign of abating. 14 The Essays in this symposium examine school
finance cases in four states. Lauren Wetzler looks at the experience of
Connecticut in Buying Equality: How School Finance Reform and
Desegregation Came to Compete in Connecticut.15 She traces how the
legislature and governor transformed a desegregation order into a monetary
remedy and identifies the resulting trade-off between funding the remedy and
meeting the needs of other struggling school districts in the state. Tico Almeida
analyzes the experience of North Carolina in Refocusing School Finance
Litigation on At-Risk Children: Leandro v. State of North Carolina.16 He
discusses the movement away from comparing district-level inequalities to
focusing on the needs of at-risk students, as illustrated by the decision of a trial
court judge to order free preschool for all at-risk four-year-olds in the state.
Tom Saunders examines the experience of Maryland in Settling Without
"Settling". School Finance Litigation and Governance Reform in Maryland.17
He evaluates the decision to settle a lawsuit against the state and the
10. See id. at 39 tbl.15, 41 tbl.15.
11. See id. at43 tbl.15, 45 tbl.15 (2003).
12. See id. at 27 tbl.15, 29 tbl.15.
13. Molly A. Hunter, Litigations Challenging Constitutionality of K-12 Funding in the 50 States, at
http://www.accessednetwork.org/litigation/In-ProcessLitigations-01-2004.pdf (last modified Jan. 7,
2004).
14. Lawsuits are active in approximately half the states. See id. In the first four months of 2004,
trial courts in Massachusetts, see Anand Vaishnav, School Financing Unfair, Judge Rules, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 27, 2004, at AI, and Montana, see Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State,
No. BDV-2002-528, slip op. at 56 (Mont. 1st Jud. D. Ct. Apr. 15, 2004) (on file with authors), found
their respective systems of school finance unconstitutional. In the same period, a trial was held in the
South Carolina case ofAbbeville v. State. Molly A. Hunter, Trials, Appeals, and Compliance Questions
in South Carolina, New Jersey, Montana, Massachusetts, Kansas, and Arkansas, at
http://www.accessednetwork.org/litigation/3-30-04LitreviewSC.htm (last modified Mar. 30, 2004). In
Kansas, the State is appealing the ruling in Montoy v. State, No. 99-C- 1738, 2003 WL 22902963 (Kan.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003), which struck down the state's school finance system. In Arkansas, the state
supreme court appointed a special master after the legislature missed a deadline to restructure the state's
school finance system. John Gehring, As Arkansas Legislature Stalls, Court Takes Action, EDUC. WK.,
Feb. 4, 2004, at 16.
15. Lauren A. Wetzler, Buying Equality: How School Finance Reform and Desegregation Came to
Compete in Connecticut, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 481 (2004).
16. Tico A. Almeida, Refocusing School Finance Litigation on At-Risk Children: Leandro v. State
of North Carolina, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 525 (2004).
17. Thomas Saunders, Settling Without "Settling": School Finance Litigation and Governance
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accompanying restructuring of the Baltimore school system, emphasizing the
flexibility associated with suing on behalf of a class of students rather than a
school system. Alexandra Greif studies the experience of New Jersey in
Politics, Practicalities, and Priorities: New Jersey's Experience Implementing
the Abbott V Mandate.18 She investigates how politics, the economy, logistical
difficulties, district-level administrative capacity, and strategic decisions by the
litigants slowed the implementation of a sweeping remedy ordered by the New
Jersey Supreme Court.
The Essays were written and workshopped as part of a full-year seminar at
Yale Law School. The project started with the recognition that school finance
litigation neither begins nor ends in the courthouse. Through interviews, court
documents, reports, and press accounts, the authors explored the impact of
political currents on the success of school finance litigation both in court and
during the creation and implementation of a remedy. One of the general lessons
to emerge is, ironically, the danger of making broad generalizations about
school finance litigation: All four authors found that state-specific factors and
historical contingencies profoundly influenced the course of litigation in the
states they studied.
That said, the Essays in this symposium, together with the experiences of
other states, suggest a number of trends within school finance litigation that
merit attention. First, a handful of courts have displayed a halting but
noticeable willingness to interpret state constitutions as mandating vertical
equity-the idea that students with greater needs should be provided with
greater resources. This trend has the potential to refocus school finance
litigation on the neediest students. Second, courts have continued to rely on
existing state academic standards to define the constitutional requirement of an
adequate education. Third, the practice of ordering a formal study to calculate
the costs of an adequate education, often called "costing out," is becoming
increasingly common to the point where it may soon become a standard
component of any school finance remedy. Fourth, a few courts have begun
experimenting with mandating specific programs, such as preschool, with a
proven track record of boosting student achievement. Finally, the existing trena
away from focusing on racial integration and toward focusing on increasing
resources to struggling schools has continued, and given current political
resistantance to redrawing district lines or busing students, even integration
orders have tended to be transformed into financial remedies.
I. THE WAVE METAPHOR AND ITS LIMITS
The history of school finance litigation is generally divided into three
18. Alexandra Greif, Politics, Practicalities, and Priorities: New Jersey's Experience Implementing
the Abbott V Mandate, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 615 (2004).
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waves. 19 The first wave began in the late 1960s with a series of lawsuits
brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution. It briefly
gained momentum after plaintiffs in Serrano v. Priest I succeeded in having the
California funding system declared unconstitutional on both state and federal
equal protection grounds, 20 but it came to an abrupt halt after the Supreme
Court issued its landmark 5-4 ruling in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez.2 1 The Rodriguez Court refused to recognize education as
a "fundamental right" under the federal constitution 22 and held that the state
interest in local control justified spending disparities among school districts.
In the second wave, plaintiffs turned to state constitutions for relief. Every
24state constitution contains some form of equal protection guarantee. In
addition, every state constitution contains an education clause mandating the
provision of a free, public education.25 The strength of these education clauses
varies, but the most common versions require states to provide a "thorough and
efficient" or "general and uniform" education. Despite the shift in focus toward
state constitutions, plaintiffs during the second wave continued to rely
predominantly on equity theories, seeking either the equalization of school
funding across districts or the creation of a system of "fiscal neutrality" in
which the same tax effort would raise the same amount of revenue in all
26districts regardless of local property wealth. Their efforts produced mixed
results. Equity suits brought between 1973 and 1989 succeeded in eight
27 2states. They failed in fifteen.2 8
19. William Thro originated the wave metaphor. See William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact
of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform
Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219 (1990). It has subsequently become ubiquitous.
20. 487 P.2d 1241 (1971).
21. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
22. Id. at 29-39.
23. Id. at 49-50.
24. See R. CRAIG WOOD & DAVID C. THOMPSON, EDUCATIONAL FINANCE LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TO STATE AID PLANS-AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES app. (2d ed. 1996) (quoting
provisions for equal treatment in forty-nine state constitutions). Although Wood and Thompson fail to
list an equal protection clause for New Jersey, the New Jersey Supreme Court has interpreted its state
constitution as containing a guarantee of equal treatment. See Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep't of Human
Servs., 828 A.2d 306, 314 (N.J. 2003) (discussing N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 1).
25. For a list of state education clauses, see Anna W. Shavers, Rethinking the Equity vs. Adequacy
Debate: Implications for Rural School Finance Reform Litigation, 82 NEB. L. REV. 133, 150 n.62
(2003).
26. The theory of fiscal neutrality gained salience after publication of JOHN E. COONS, WILLIAM H.
CLUNE III & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970).
27. See Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest (Serrano
II), 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Helena Elementary Sch.
Dist. No. I v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.
1973); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood I), 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Pauley v.
Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. I v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310
(Wyo. 1980).
28. See Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d
1005 (Colo. 1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d
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The third wave began, according to traditional accounts, in 1989 when the
Kentucky Supreme Court declared the entire state system of education
unconstitutional under the state education clause. 29 The Kentucky Supreme
Court relied on an adequacy theory rather than an equity theory. Adequacy
focuses on bringing all schools up to a certain standard of quality, but once this
standard is met, adequacy allows districts with greater means to supplement
their local schools. Early observers tended to assume that adequacy would
leave intact significant disparities between property-wealthy and property-poor
districts. Arthur Wise wrote "I do not greet the emergence of the principle of
educational adequacy as necessarily a good turn of events .... it represents a
lowering of our ideals." 30 Even in arguing for a shift from equity to adequacy,
Peter Enrich referred to the "more achievable, but more modest, goals of
adequacy. ' 31 Nevertheless, a series of adequacy victories in the wake of the
Kentucky decision cemented its role as the dominant legal theory in school
finance litigation today.
32
The shift toward adequacy, however, has been neither as sudden nor as
complete as the wave metaphor suggests. Plaintiffs won early adequacy
victories in Washington in 197833 and West Virginia in 1979,34 and plaintiffs
635 (Idaho 1975); People ex rel. Jones v. Adams, 350 N.E.2d 767 (I11. App. Ct. 1976); Hornbeck v.
Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); E. Jackson Pub. Schs. v. State, 348 N.W.2d
303 (Mich. 1984); Bd. of Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); Britt v. N.C. State
Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987); Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio
1979); Fair Sch. Fin. Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or.
1976); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C.
1988); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
29. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
30. Arthur E. Wise, Minimum Educational Adequacy: Beyond School Finance Reform, I J. EDUC.
FtN. 468, 479 (1976).
31. Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND.
L. REv. 101, 182 (1995).
32. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the
Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont
II), 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997); DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997). Bismarck
Public School District No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994), is not counted as a plaintiff victory
even though three of the five justices on the North Dakota Supreme Court voted to invalidate the school
finance system, because a super-majority is required to strike down a statute in North Dakota. More
recently, courts in Alabama and Ohio have retreated from their earlier adequacy decisions. The Alabama
Supreme Court dismissed further proceedings in 2002 based on separaiion of powers concerns, stating
"it is the Legislature, not the courts, from which any further redress should be sought." Exparte James,
836 So. 2d 813, 815 (Ala. 2002). The Ohio Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition in 2003
forbidding the trial court from exercising further jurisdiction over the case. State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d
195 (Ohio), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 432 (2003).
33. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
34. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979). The Supreme Court of West Virginia decided
Pauley on both adequacy and equity grounds. The court later reinterpreted Pauley exclusively as an
adequacy case. See State ex rel. Bds. of Educ. v. Chafin, 376 S.E.2d 113, 121 (W. Va. 1988) ("We find
the true focus of Pauley to be whether the State has complied with its constitutional duty to provide
school financing in a manner, and at a level, that is thorough and efficient .... Is the basic foundation
program, the minimum level of funding guaranteed by the State, constitutionally sufficient to meet the
county's education needs?").
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have continued bringing equity challenges deep into the third wave. 35 There has
also been renewed interest in returning to the early roots of school finance
litigation in the civil rights movement by seeking racial and socio-economic
integration. 36  Moreover, individual lawsuits sometimes defy clear
categorization, since the ability to plead multiple causes of action in the same
complaint allows plaintiffs to embrace several theories at once.
37
The persistence of multiple legal theories has been matched by significant
variation among cases brought under the same legal theory. The lawsuits in
North Carolina, Maryland, and New Jersey were all "adequacy" cases, but they
have followed strikingly different trajectories. The Essays in this symposium
highlight the impact a single judge can have on the nature of a court decision, 38
the complex political dynamics surrounding the passage and implementation of
a remedy,3 9 the capacity of local officials to thwart or facilitate the
40implementation of reform, and the ability of individual lawmakers committed
to the cause of equal educational opportunity to push changes through a
reluctant legislature. 4 1 In short, they demonstrate that even so-called
"adequacy" cases are not alike, and that the progress and success of each case
depends on local context.
II. VERTICAL EQUITY
Although the importance of state-specific factors cautions against
overbroad generalizations, the Essays in this symposium highlight several
important trends within school finance litigation. First, they document a limited
movement toward vertical equity. Horizontal equity refers to the equalization
of funding across districts without adjustment based on student need. Arthur
Wise described it as a "one pupil, one dollar" principle.42 Under horizontal
35. See, e.g., Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1997); Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994); Sch. Admin. Dist. No. I v. Comm'r, Dep't of
Educ., 659 A.2d 854 (Me. 1995); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys.
v. McWherter (Tennessee Small School Systems II1), 91 S.W.3d 232 (Tenn. 2002); Tenn. Small Sch.
Sys. v. McWherter (Tennessee Small School Systems 1), 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Brigham v.
State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997); see also Avidan Y. Cover, Is "Adequacy" a More "Political Question"
than "Equality?": The Effect of Standards-Based Education on Judicial Standards for Education
Finance, II CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 403, 420 (2002) ("Reports of the demise of the equality
standard and claim have been greatly exaggerated.").
36. See Sheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money,
109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999).
37. See, e.g., Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1271-72; DeRolph 1, 677 N.E.2d at 740 & n.5; Tenn. Small Sch.
Sys. 1, 851 S.W.2d at 141.
38. See Almeida, supra note 16, at 535; Wetzler, supra note 15, at 499 & nn.121-22.
39. Greif, supra note 18, at 628-43; Saunders, supra note 17, at 591-93, 607-09; Wetzler, supra
note 15, at 499-503.
40. Greif, supra note 18, at 650-52.
41. Saunders, supra note 17, at 595, 609.
42. See ARTHUR WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS: THE PROMISE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY 156 (1967). Although Wise has become associated with the one scholar, one dollar
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equity, "every individual is treated the same and all students are considered
equivalent. ''43 Vertical equity, in contrast, recognizes that a dollar spent in a
troubled urban school is not likely to produce the same result as a dollar spent
in a stable suburban community. It calls for resources to be distributed in
accordance with need in order give students an equal opportunity to achieve the
same outcome.
Considerations of horizontal equity and vertical equity are not confined to
cases brought on equal protection grounds. Adequacy and equity may be
distinct legal theories, but they blur considerably in practice. All else equal,
improving the adequacy of struggling schools will tend to reduce disparities
and produce a more equal system of education. Likewise, equalization that
levels-up will improve the adequacy of schools at the bottom.44 The line
between adequacy and equity becomes especially hazy when a court
acknowledges that underprivileged children may need more resources to
succeed than other children. This conception of "adequacy as vertical equity"
has the potential to invert traditional spending patterns that currently relegate
the neediest students to schools unable to bear the cost of their education.
Despite its promise, the movement toward vertical equity has been slow.
Although school finance litigation was partially motivated by a desire to assist
poor students, those students have not been the focus of many school finance
remedies. In the past, courts rarely even discussed whether poor students might
be entitled to additional funding to address their special needs. Even those that
did discuss the issue hardly ever ordered that states provide such funding."5 The
cases discussed in the Essays that follow suggest that this practice may be
changing, as litigants and courts are beginning to pay more attention to the
special needs of disadvantaged students.
New Jersey has taken the biggest step toward vertical equity. In Abbott v.
Burke II, the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered the State to lift property-poor
school districts to the spending levels of property-wealthy districts. 46 It then
instructed the state to provide additional money to meet the special needs of
Abbott districts.4 7 The court continued along the same vein in Abbott V when it
formulation, he recognized that "lt]o offer students of different ability similar amounts of resources, as
measured in dollars, may, in fact be to treat them unequally." Id. He stated "it would be most
unfortunate if the present study were to be read as a call for 'one student, one dollar" Id. at xiii.
43. Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
493, 495 (1995).
44. This relationship between adequacy and equity does not always hold. Margeret Goertz has
explained, "A school funding system can be equitable, yet not adequate, if the level of support is low.
An educational system, however, can be adequate, yet inequitable, if wealthier communities are free to
provide additional educational services that poorer communities cannot afford." Margaret E. Goertz,
Program Equity and Adequacy: Issues from the Field, 8 EDUC. POL'Y 608, 609 (1994).
45. ANNA LUKEMEYER, COURTS AS POLICYMAKERS: SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM LITIGATION 95
(2003).
46. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 408 (N.J. 1990).
47. See Greif, supra note 18, at 621.
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mandated half-day preschool for three- and four-year-olds in Abbott districts
and instructed the state to fund certain supplemental programs requested by
individual districts.
A similar shift toward vertical equity occurred in North Carolina. The
Leandro litigation began as a traditional adequacy suit aimed at correcting
interdistrict disparities, but the trial judge reoriented the litigation on remand in
2001 to focus on at-risk students, as defined by a series of risk factors ranging
from poverty and poor health to family instability and low parental education.48
The judge attempted to compensate for these disadvantages by ordering quality
preschool for all at-risk four-year-olds.
Maryland also incorporated principles of vertical equity into its remedy,
even in the absence of a clear judicial mandate. Although the original suit was
filed on behalf of a class of at-risk children, the class remained geographically
constrained and only included students in Baltimore. After settlement of the
suit, lawmakers expanded its reach beyond Baltimore to provide supplemental
funding for at-risk students in other school systems. The State then set in
motion a process that culminated in the passage of a new funding formula
weighted to provide twice the normal amount of funding for poor, disabled, and
Limited English Proficiency students.4 9
It is still too early to assess the success of vertical equity in New Jersey,
North Carolina, and Maryland: The failure to adopt a clear definition of
"supplemental programs" and an economic downtum have slowed the
implementation of vertical equity in New Jersey; 50 the remedy in Maryland has
not been fully funded in the long term;51 and the North Carolina case was still
pending on appeal at the time this symposium went to print. Nevertheless, the
early indications from New Jersey and Maryland are positive. Between 1999
and 2002, the g~p between New Jersey fourth graders in Abbott and non-
Abbott districts on the language arts portion of the Elementary School
Proficiency Assessment narrowed by fifteen points.52 The percentage of
students in Abbott districts scoring at the lowest level on the test declined from
66.2% to 29.6%. 3 Baltimore has also posted impressive achievement gains,
with students making steady progress across all subject areas and improving at
a rate faster than the state as a whole.
54
Apart from its impact on achievement, vertical equity has the potential to
48. Almeida, supra note 16, at 538.
49. Saunders, supra note 17, at 605.
50. See Greif, supra note 18, at 635.
51. Saunders, supra note 17, at 609.
52. Educ. Law Ctr., Achievement Data Presented to Supreme Court by Dr. Bari Erlichson and Dr.
Robert Slavin (Apr. 9, 2003), http://www.edlawcenter.org/ELCPublic/Alert_0403_DataSummary.htm.
53. Id.
54. Saunders, supra note 17, at 611-12.
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shift the focus of school finance litigation from school districts to individual
students. Although the Abbott remedy in New Jersey has remained
geographically bounded and reaches students in only thirty districts, the
programs in North Carolina and Maryland apply to at-risk students wherever
they reside. This practice of targeting at-risk students within a statewide class
holds substantial promise, both for the political appeal of school finance reform
and for the targeted students.
School finance litigation can pit the interests of school districts against each
other. Wetzler discusses how the flow of resources into Hartford after the Sheff
litigation left other cities in Connecticut struggling to provide an adequate
education and eventually prompted those districts to file suit against the state.
55
Almeida explores the potential tension between rural and urban school
districts.56 Saunders examines attempts by Montgomery County, the wealthiest
district in Maryland, to intervene in the school finance case on behalf of the
state. 57 Greif notes a lawsuit brought by non-Abbott districts complaining about
their exclusion from the Abbott remedy.
58
Focusing on at-risk students can help bridge these divides. Almost every
school district in a state contains some at-risk students. A statewide remedy
directed toward helping at-risk students accordingly distributes at least some
money to almost all legislative districts. The experiences of Maryland and
North Carolina indicate that this expansion can pay political dividends. In
North Carolina, urban and rural districts managed to come together after some
early tensions to adopt a lockstep litigation strategy based on helping at-risk
students.59 In Maryland, both the original remedy and subsequent funding
formula became stuck in the General Assembly until lawmakers expanded the
bills to cover students across the state. 60 Although pursuit of vertical equity is
not a necessary prerequisite to such political horse-trading, vertical equity's
tendency to look at students rather than districts provides a theoretical
underpinning for the decision to broaden a remedy.
At the same time, a focus on at-risk students has the potential to make
school finance litigation more effective by targeting the neediest students. The
traditional focus of school finance litigation on district-level property wealth
has been roundly criticized. The Rodriguez Court noted, "there is reason to
believe that the poorest families are not necessarily clustered in the poorest
property districts."61 William Fischel has more recently argued, "It is time to
55. Wetzler, supra note 15, at 516-18.
56. Almeida, supra note 16, at 555-56.
57. Saunders, supra note 17, at 585.
58. Greif, supra note 18, at 626 n.85.
59. Almeida, supra note 16, at 555-56.
60. Almeida, supra note 16, at 557; Saunders, supra note 17, at 593, 609.
61. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23 (1973).
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abandon the false equations of poor people with poor districts and rich people
with rich districts. ' ' 62 A statewide system of vertical equity responds to these
criticisms by channeling resources where they are most needed.
The shift toward vertical equity does not guarantee political success, of
course, as some districts still will receive more funding than others, depending
on their student populations. Vertical equity also presupposes a baseline of
adequacy for all students without special needs, and in some states achieving
even this level of adequacy may require significant redistribution of wealth to
some districts. In addition, the very thing that could make vertical equity
somewhat attractive politically-the wide dispersal of funds throughout a
state-may also limit its effectiveness. In the absence of funding increases or
efficiency gains, a trade-off exists between the breadth and depth of any school
finance remedy. Expanding the remedy risks diluting its impact by spreading
resources too thinly and thus compromising their effectiveness.63
Any attempt to achieve vertical equity also requires tackling some difficult
issues that have already plagued efforts to achieve adequacy. Defining what
constitutes an adequate education first requires determining what set of
knowledge and skills schools should teach to each student. The answer to this
question requires a clear conception of the purpose of public education. What
skills should a high school graduate possess? Should graduates be equipped to
compete in a local, national, or international economy? What knowledge is
required to produce good citizens? For financial remedies, these abstract
findings must then be translated into dollars and cents. Achieving vertical
equity requires yet another step, namely determining what types of
supplemental assistance students with special needs require, and how much that
assistance will cost. All of these tasks strain the competency of the courts.
This does not mean that courts are without any recourse. The Essays in this
symposium discuss several promising responses to the difficulties described
above: reliance on existing state standards; expert calculation of the cost of an
adequate education; input remedies, particularly the creation of preschool
programs; and desegregation remedies that aim to combat the unique
disadvantages associated with concentrations of poverty. These strategies are
discussed in turn.
III. SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION AND THE STANDARDS MOVEMENT
One response to concerns about the competency of courts to define an
62. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 135 (2001).
63. Title 1, the federal government's largest education aid program, which is ostensibly supposed to
assist poor students, has been criticized on precisely this ground. See, e.g., Erik W. Robelen, Off
Target?, EDUC. WK., Sept. 5, 2001, at I (describing ongoing debate over whether to target federal
money or disburse it widely).
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adequate education has been reliance on existing state standards. 64 Adequacy
vaulted to prominence as a legal theory at the same time the standards
movement was gaining momentum. Observers were quick to point out the
potential link between the two movements. In 1987, Julius Chambers, the
Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, noted
that the standards movement presented "an affirmative opportunity to define a
right to a minimally adequate education." 65 in 1990, James Liebman argued
that "by enacting specific and universally applicable minimum standards, state
legislators have made the hard policy decisions, leaving the courts with an
enforcement role that conforms to traditional visions of the judicial function." 66
Others scholars have sounded similar themes. 67 In fact, the use of standards to
help define adequacy has become so common that it is easy to forget that
alternatives exist.
One alternative option pioneered by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Rose
v. Council for Better Education, Inc. is for the judiciary to generate a list of
capabilities students must possess. Several courts followed the lead of
Kentucky,68 but the willingness of courts to craft their own definitions of an
adequate education appears to have waned. In addition to the obvious
legitimacy concerns, court-created standards tend to proceed at such a high
level of generality that it is difficult to translate them into enforceable
benchmarks for measuring the progress of implementation. How is a court to
tell whether a student will "live up to his or her full human potential" or has the
background necessary "to appreciate his or her cultural and historical
heritage? '69 By contrast, legislatively created standards tend to be associated
with detailed accountability and testing regimes that express broad goals in
terms of measurable outcomes.
Another option, embraced most clearly by the 'New Jersey Supreme Court,
64. See Almeida, supra note 16, at 543-49; Saunders, supra note 17, at 579.
65. Julius Chambers, Adequate Education for All. A Right, An Achievable Goal, 22 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 55, 61 (1987) (emphasis removed).
66. James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political Reconstruction, Liberal
Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 VA. L. REv. 349, 415-16 (1990)
(emphasis removed).
67. See, e.g., Molly S. McUsic, The Law's Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises and
Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAW & SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 88, 117 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School
Finance Litigation and the "Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1175
(1995) ("[A]dequacy court decisions largely cohere with the emerging educational standards
movement.").
68. Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 107-08 (Ala. 1993); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the
Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremont 11), 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997).
69. See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d at 108 (requiring "[s]ufficient support and guidance so
that every student feels a sense of self-worth and ability to achieve, and so that every student is
encouraged to live up to his or her full human potential" and "[s]ufficient understanding of the arts to
enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural heritage and the cultural heritages of others").
Yale Law & Policy Review
defines adequacy in relative terms by looking for guidance to the opportunities
provided in thriving school districts. 70 This approach is based on the premise
that "[a]n educational system that precluded the students of poorer districts
from competing in the same market and society as their peers could not, by
definition, be providing an adequate education." 71 This approach has much to
commend it. To the extent that adequacy is a relative term, and what is an
adequate education in one school or district depends on the quality of education
provided elsewhere, comparing educational opportunities across districts makes
sense. Nonetheless, relative definitions of adequacy encounter difficulty when
high-spending school districts go beyond core educational goals to provide
extras like swimming pools and artificial turf fields.
72
Depending on the benchmark for comparison, moreover, defining adequacy
through comparability could essentially require leveling up to the highest
spending districts, which is both practically and politically infeasible in many
states. In light of the problems associated with this approach to adequacy, and
given the ubiquity of standards and their relative popularity, standards will
continue to play a prominent role in adequacy lawsuits.
But growing reliance on standards is not an entirely positive development.
Abstract lists of capabilities created by the courts may prompt jokes, 73 but they
usually look at a broader set of criteria than state standards. Critics have
accused the standards movement of focusing too narrowly on core academic
subjects and testable skills at the expense of social studies, art, and other
subjects. 74 A recent survey of 956 elementary and secondary school principals
in five states revealed a marked shift away from teaching subjects not covered
70. See Deborah A. Verstegen & Terry Whitney, From Courthouses to Schoolhouses: Emerging
Judicial Theories of Adequacy and Equity, 11 EDUC. POL'Y 330, 347 (1997) ("What was adequate was
largely determined by the education resources and learner outcomes evident in the best or highest
spending districts.").
71. McUsic, supra note 67, at 116-17.
72. Swimming pools and high-quality athletic facilities are often cited to illustrate disparities
among districts. See, e.g., Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 808 (Ariz.
1994); J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest for Education
Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 607, 607 (1999). But critics do not necessarily believe equalizing such
amenities is worth the expense. See Noreen O'Grady, Comment, Toward a Thorough and Efficient
Education: Resurrecting the Pennsylvania Education Clause, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 613, 634 n.123 (1994)
("Defining this minimum level of education challenges courts to perform the difficult task of drawing a
line between academic essentials and services which are only tangentially related to basic education,
such as Astroturf stadiums and heated swimming pools. Attempts to equalize such frills would probably
be pointless and prohibitively expensive.").
73. In reaction to the McDuffy decision in Massachusetts, the Boston Herald quipped that Harvard
"probably wishes its graduates possessed all the skills and knowledge" described by the court. Enrich,
supra note 31, at 175 n.348 (quoting Editorial, The SC's Wishful Thinking, BOSTON HERALD, June 16,
1993, at 28).
74. See, e.g., ALFIE KOHN, THE CASE AGAINST STANDARDIZED TESTING: RAISING THE SCORES,
RUINING THE SCHOOLS (2000); SUSAN OHANIAN, ONE SIZE FITS FEW: THE FOLLY OF EDUCATIONAL
STANDARDS (1999); PETER SACKS, STANDARDIZED MINDS: THE HIGH PRICE OF AMERICA'S TESTING
CULTURE AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO CHANGE IT (1999).
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on standardized tests. Twenty-five percent of principals reported decreasing
time allocated to arts instruction since 2000, and thirty-three percent anticipated
future decreases over the next two years.75 For foreign language study, only
thirteen percent reported declines in instructional time, but nineteen percent
anticipated future cuts. 7 6 Exclusive reliance on standards risks constraining the
constitutional guarantee to an adequate education with the same tunnel vision
that afflicts the standards movement.
Another danger is that lawmakers will set standards too low initially or
respond to the threat of litigation by lowering them. Molly McUsic has
expressed optimism that lawmakers will not interfere. She wrote, "it would
seem politically perilous for the legislature to inoculate themselves [sic] from
lawsuits by creating low standards." 77 But recent manipulation in response to
the No Child Left Behind Act has reignited concern about relying too heavily
on standards in the context of school finance litigation.
78
IV. CALCULATING THE COST OF AN ADEQUATE EDUCATION
Reliance on state standards may help courts determine whether schools are
providing a high-quality education, but standards do not necessarily tell courts
what remedial steps are needed to improve educational opportunity. Significant
disagreement exists about the extent to which resources influence student
achievement.79 Navigating the uncertainty proves particularly difficult under a
system of vertical equity in which input levels must be adjusted to
accommodate for different student needs. It is inherently hard for courts, or
even legislatures, to say with any degree of precision what resources a poor
student from a broken home needs to receive the same educational opportunity
as a middle-class student raised in a two-parent household.
Recognizing their own technical limitations, courts and legislatures have
displayed a growing willingness to commission expert reports calculating the
cost of an adequate education. Indeed, reliance on costing-out studies promises
to be one of the most important trends in school finance litigation over the next
decade. The idea of creating an expert commission to draft a school finance
75. CLAUS VON ZASTROW, COUNCIL FOR BASIC EDUC., ACADEMIC ATROPHY: THE CONDITION OF
THE LIBERAL ARTS IN AMERICA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 16 (2004), available at http://www.c-b-
e.org/PDF/cbe_principalReport.pdf.
76. Id. at 17.
77. McUsic, supra note 67, at 117.
78. Almeida, supra note 16, at 546; Greif, supra note 18, at 629 & n.107.
79. See, e.g., DOES MONEY MATrER?: THE EFFECT OF SCHOOL RESOURCES ON STUDENT
ACHIEVEMENT AND ADULT SUCCESS (Gary Burtless ed., 1996); John Dayton, Correlating Expenditures
and Educational Opportunity in School Funding Litigation: The Judicial Perspective, 19 J. EDUC. FIN.
167, 169 & nn.10- 11 (1993) (listing state courts that have accepted and courts that have rejected the
correlation between expenditures and educational opportunity); Michael Heise, The Courts, Education
Policy, and Unintended Consequences, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 633, 656 n.148 (2002)
(collecting sources debating whether money matters).
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remedy is not new, but requiring the creation of such a commission in a court
order is of more recent origin. The practice began in 1995 when the Wyoming
Supreme Court ordered the legislature to conduct a "cost of education study" to
"inform the creation of a new funding system."80 The Arkansas Supreme Court
followed suit in 2002.81 In response to a 1994 lower court decision pointing out
the lack of reports calculating the cost of a "a general, suitable and efficient"
education, the General Assembly had called on the State Board of Education to
82conduct an adequacy study by the end of 1996. But the analysis had never
been conducted. Although the Arkansas Supreme Court stopped short of
ordering a full costing out as part of the school finance remedy, it stated, "the
fact that the Department of Education has refused to prepare an adequacy study
is extremely troublesome and frustrating to this court."83 The message was
unmistakable, and a year later Arkansas released a report.
84
The most recent order to conduct a costing-out study came from the New
York Court of Appeals. 85 It criticized the legislature for allowing politics rather
than student need to drive the state funding formula. 86 Evidence in the record
indicated that state officials regularly struck political compromises divvying up
state aid and then worked backwards to create funding formulas that produced
the desired result. 87 The court effectively ordered the State to reverse the
process by "determin[ing], to the extent possible, the actual costs of the
resources needed to provide the opportunity for a sound basic education in all
school districts in the state" and then "ensur[ing] that at a minimum every
school district has the necessary funds to provide an opportunity for a sound
basic education to all of its students."
88
In addition to studies conducted under court order, more than a third of the
states have initiated their own studies in the past eight years. 89 Several were
commissioned in the wake of school finance rulings. In his Essay, Saunders
examines the Maryland study completed in 2002.90 The study combined the
two most popular approaches to calculating the cost of an adequate education:
"successful schools" and "professional judgment." The successful schools
80. Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995).
81. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 486 (Ark. 2002).
82. Id,
83. Id.
84. See ALLAN ODDEN ET AL., AN EVIDENCE-BASED APPROACH TO SCHOOL FINANCE ADEQUACY
IN ARKANSAS (2003), available at http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/data/education/FinalArkansas
Report.pdf.
85. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE II), 801 N.E.2d 326, 360 (N.Y. 2003).
86. Id. at 357.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 360.
89. Molly A. Hunter, Status of Adequacy "Costing-Out" Studies in the 50 States, at
http://www.accessednetwork.org/research/Costing-OutChart.pdf (last modified Apr. 15, 2004).
90. Saunders, supra note 17, at 602-07
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method looks to individual schools or school districts meeting state standards
and then carefully analyzes their spending patterns. In many ways, it resembles
the New Jersey approach of using high-quality suburban school districts as a
benchmark, except that the successful schools method tries to limit the
comparison to resources directly linked to high achievement. The professional
judgment approach asks panels of experienced educators to design model
programs they believe will be sufficient to provide an adequate education.
Experts then calculate the cost of implementing the model programs. In
Maryland, the two methods complimented each other and produced relatively
similar figures, 91 but such a harmonious result in not guaranteed. In New York,
a study initiated by the plaintiffs but conducted independently relied primarily
on the professional judgment approach 92 and concluded that providing an
adequate education across the state would require an additional investment of
$6.21 and $8.40 billion per year.93 The official state commission used the
successful schools approach 94 and produced a lower range of $2.5 to $5.6
billion.
95
Saunders also discusses the tendency of politics to creep into the work of
costing-out commissions. 96 Although political manipulation can undermine a
commission's objectivity, Saunders argues that political involvement in
calculating of the cost of an adequate education can be an asset in some
circumstances. 97 The presence of politicians on a commission can improve the
chances of producing a politically viable plan. It also gives those politicians a
sense of ownership over the proposal that emerges. One problem with the
official state commission in New York is that it did not include any lawmakers,
representatives from the mayor's office, plaintiffs, or members of the state or
city departments of education.98 The report was accordingly received as only a
"starting point" for debate rather than a comprehensive legislative roadmap.99
91. Id. at 605.
92. AM. INSTS. FOR RESEARCH & MGMT. ANALYSIS & PLANNING, INC., THE NEW YORK
ADEQUACY STUDY: DETERMINING THE COST OF PROVIDING ALL CHILDREN IN NEW YORK AN
ADEQUATE EDUCATION 1 (2004), available at http://www.cfequity.org/FINALCOSTINGOUT3-30-
04.pdf.
93. Id.
94. N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON EDUC. REFORM, FINAL REPORT 22 (2004), available at
http://www.state.ny.us/pdfs/finalreportweb.pdf.
95. Id. at 24.
96. Saunders, supra note 17, at 606.
97. Saunders, supra note 17, at 606-07.
98. Al Baker, How to Obey Schools Ruling? Pataki and Bloomberg Differ, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27,
2003, at B1.
99. See At Baker, Panel Reports on Cost of "'Sound Basic Education, " But Many Say the Question
Remains, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2004, at B4.
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V. THE PRESCHOOL REMEDY
To the extent courts do not trust lawmakers to assess the needs of schools
objectively and pass an acceptable remedy, they may be tempted to order the
state to undertake more specific remedial steps. One possibility explored by
courts in New Jersey and North Carolina is to mandate preschool programs for
at-risk students. In New Jersey, as a result of the Abbott litigation, three- and
four-year-olds who live in Abbott districts are entitled to attend a publicly
funded preschool. In North Carolina, the trial court judge, in a ruling currently
on appeal, has similarly ordered the state to provide preschool to all at-risk
four-year-olds in the state.
The growing interest in preschool has been fueled by social science
evidence strongly and consistently demonstrating the benefits of early
childhood education. As Almeida describes in his Essay on North Carolina,
"research findings from a spectrum of academics, think tanks, government
agencies, and even one of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks have consistently
shown strong benefits resulting from preschool education."1 °° This research,
moreover, is generally considered stronger and more reliable than similar
research on the broader question of the relationship between expenditures and
academic achievement. 10 1 The relative strength of the social science evidence
might provide encouragement and confidence to other courts contemplating
mandating preschool as part of a school finance remedy, although questions
remain in the research as to whether the successful programs studied could be
replicated on a larger scale.'
0 2
Even putting aside questions about the strengths and limitations of the
research about preschool, some courts may remain reluctant to order preschool
programs on separation of powers grounds. When the Arkansas Supreme Court
overturned a trial court decision mandating preschool, it wrote
[T]he trial court could not order the implementation of pre-school programs in any
event. That is a public-policy issue for the General Assembly to explore and
resolve. It is elementary that the powers of our state government are divided into
three separate branches of government. The state constitution further provides that
one branch of government shall not exercise the power of another. 
103
In light of these concerns, courts may refrain from ordering specific remedies
like preschool until the political branches have demonstrated a pattern of non-
responsiveness to judicial school finance rulings. After all, it took twenty-five
years of bouncing remedies between the court and the legislature for the New
Jersey Supreme Court to issue its opinion in Abbott V.
100. Almeida, supra note 16, at 562 (citations omitted).
101. Id.at562-63.
102. Id. at 563.
103. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 501 (Ark. 2002) (citations
omitted).
Vol. 22:463, 2004
Foreword to School Finance Symposium
Moreover, as Greif argues in her Essay, ordering a specific remedy does not
guarantee it will be implemented as the court intended. Although observers
frequently criticize courts for issuing vague opinions in school finance
litigation cases, 104 Greif demonstrates that the same political and logistical
difficulties associated with insufficient judicial guidance can hinder
implementation of a detailed order. In New Jersey, political noncompliance
forced the plaintiffs to return to court in 1999105 and once again in 2001106 to
obtain further instructions. Practical difficulties, such as a shortage of qualified
teachers, further delayed implementation. 107 New Jersey thus serves as a
cautionary tale for courts thinking about ordering preschool as a remedy in
school finance litigation. It reminds them that enforcing a positive
constitutional right can require substantial and ongoing oversight. But for
courts willing to stay the course, preschool represents a promising option with a
proven track record of raising student achievement.
VI. DESEGREGATION
S
As the name implies, school finance litigation tends to focus on revenue
and expenditures, and most school finance cases do not directly address the
problems associated with racial and socioeconomic isolation. But doubts about
the efficacy of monetary remedies and evidence of the ability of integration to
improve the achievement of disadvantaged students without reducing the
achievement levels of other students have prompted calls to reorient school
finance litigation by seeking integration. 0 8  Recognizing the political
difficulties associated with mandatory busing, scholars have focused instead on
magnet schools, 10 9 interdistrict school voucher plans,' 10 and the redrawing of
school district boundaries1 1 as potential remedies in school finance cases.
104. See, e.g., Josh Kagan, Note, A Civics Action: Interpreting "Adequacy" in State Constitutions'
Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241, 2251-53 (2003) (criticizing the Ohio and Alabama
Supreme Courts for failing to provide sufficient guidance to the legislature); Erin E. Buzuvis, Note, "A"
for Effort. Evaluating Recent State Education Reform in Response to Judicial Demands for Equity and
Adequacy, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 644, 670 (2001) ("Lack of guidance from the court... can be
problematic during the remedy phase."). But see id. ("Conversely, courts that define adequacy too
extensively run the risk of constraining the legislature."); Aaron Saiger, Note, Disestablishing Local
School Districts as a Remedy for Educational Inadequacy, 99 COLtJM. L. REV. 1830, 1839 (1999)
(characterizing Abbott V as "presposterous in its specificity").
105. Greif, supra note 18, at 631.
106. Id. at 633.
107. Id. at 648-69.
108. See Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of
the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1334 (2004); Ryan, supra note 36.
109. Ryan, supra note 36, at 309.
110. Id. at 310-15; James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 529, 560-62 (1999).
111. Angela Ciolfi, Note, Shuffling the Deck: Redistricting to Promote a Quality Education in
Virginia, 89 VA. L. REv. 773 (2003).
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In her Essay about Connecticut, Wetzler studies Sheff v. O'Neill, a rare case
ordering desegregation under a state constitution. Her findings cast doubt on
the prospect of states achieving a meaningful degree of integration in the near
future. Just as political pressure transformed a prior generation of federal
desegregation cases into monetary remedies, Wetzler describes how political
maneuvering in Connecticut has limited interdistrict mixing and largely
replaced it with an infusion of resources into Hartford and other "priority"
school districts." 2 What began as a potentially radical new approach has thus
been transformed into a more traditional school finance suit, albeit with some
modest goals for increasing integration. In this sense, Connecticut is actually
following a path similar to the ones being laid down in New Jersey, Maryland,
and North Carolina. The Essays that follow make clear that fifty years after
Brown v. Board of Education, litigants fighting for better educational
opportunities for poor and minority students are now relying primarily on
money rather than integration to improve the quality of the nation's most
troubled schools. Perhaps more than anything, the shift away from integration
reflects public weariness with fifty years of trying to force students from
different racial and economic backgrounds to attend school together. In a 1994
Gallup poll, sixty percent of African-Americans considered higher funding to
be the best way to help minority students, compared to twenty-five percent who
selected integration."13 Sixty-four percent said they would choose local schools
over integrated schools outside their community.
114
Despite these sentiments, the verdict remains out on whether increasing
resources in the absence of meaningful racial or socioeconomic integration is
an effective way to improve academic achievement. In the coming years,
Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, and New Jersey will serve as test
cases. All four states are in the process of implementing finance systems and
programs that have the potential to achieve a remarkable degree of vertical
equity. Some early evidence regarding the impact of these reforms on student
achievement is promising, but it remains to be seen whether these initial gains
will be sustained.
112. Wetzler, supra note 15, at 519-20.
113. See James Bock, "Resegregated" Schools Not All Bad, Some Say, BALT. SUN, May 20, 1996,
at IA.
114. Id.
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